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INTRODUCTION

Lucian E. Dervan
In the summer of 2015, experts gathered from around the country to
sit together and discuss one of the most pressing and important issues
facing the American criminal justice system-innocence. Innocence is an
issue that pervades various areas of research and influences numerous
topics of discussion. What does innocence mean, particularly in a system
that differentiates between innocence and acquittal at sentencing? What
is the impact of innocence during plea bargaining? How should society
respond to the growing number of exonerations? What forces lead to the
incarceration of innocents? Has an innocent person been put to death and,
if so, what does this mean for capital punishment? As these and other
examples demonstrate, the importance and influence of the innocence
issue is boundless. As the group-representing various perspectives,
disciplines, and areas of research-discussed these and other questions,
it also considered the role of innocence in the criminal justice system
more broadly and examined where the innocence issue might take society
in the future. What follows is a collection of short essays from some of
those in attendance-essays upon which society might reflect as it
continues to consider the varying sides and differing answers to the issue
of innocence.
My own research regarding innocence began as part of a deep analysis
of another topic-the historical rise of plea bargaining in the United
States. Today, more than ninety-seven percent of convictions in the
federal system and approximately ninety-five percent of felony
convictions in the state systems are the result of guilty pleas. 1 Plea
bargaining did not always occupy such a dominant role in America. For
1.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig. C

(2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-so
urcebooks/2014/FigureC.pdf, Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People PleadGuilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/.
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example, in the post-Civil War period, appellate courts regularly struck
down attempts to engage in plea bargaining. 2 According to one court from
the period, plea bargaining was "hardly, if at all, distinguishable in
principle from a direct sale ofjustice." 3 But plea bargaining did rise from
the shadows-in the words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy
in 2012, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not
a system of trials." 4
As I proceeded with my research on plea bargaining's rise and its
mechanics, I quickly came upon plea bargaining's innocence issue. For
example, in 2002, a seventeen-year-old high-school student named Brian
Banks was accused of rape.5 He was offered a plea bargain that carried a
maximum sentence of seven years in prison, though he was assured he
would actually serve much less time. 6 The alternative was to proceed to
trial and face a sentence of forty-one years to life if he lost. 7 As might be
expected, Banks took the deal. Nearly a decade after the conviction,
Banks's accuser recanted, and his conviction was reversed on March 24,
2012.9 Stories such as this led to much debate and contemplation about
the impact of plea bargaining on defendants accused of crimes they had
not committed. Were the Brian Banks of the world an anomaly?
In 1970, the Supreme Court stated that plea bargaining was
constitutional.1 0 In part, this decision rested on the Court's belief that
innocent people do not plead guilty." Was the Court wrong in making
that assumption? These questions led me and Dr. Vanessa Edkins to
conduct a psychological study to test how likely it was that an innocent
defendant might falsely confess and plead guilty in return for an offer of
leniency. 1 2

2. Lucian E. Dervan, BargainedJustice: Plea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem and the
Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 58 (2012).

3. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877).
4. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
5. Brian Banks, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT(Mar. 14,2016), http://califomiainnocenceproject.
org/read-their-stoies/brian-banks/.
6. See id

7. Id.
8. See id.

9. Id
10. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970).
11. Id. at 758 ("We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty

pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by

&

.

competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary . .
see also Dervan, supra note 2, at 87.
12. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L.

CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013) (discussing a psychological study regarding plea bargaining and
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In the study, participants were made to believe that they were
participating in a psychological inquiry into group work versus individual
work. 1 3 Participants were instructed that offering assistance to someone
else during the individual work portion of the test was prohibited. 14
Nevertheless, in approximately half of the cases, the participant was
approached. 15 Unbeknownst to the participants, however, the individual
asking for the assistance was actually a confederate working with us on
the study.1 6 This study design resulted in the creation of two pools of
participants: Those who had been asked for assistance and agreed (the
"guilty" condition) and those who had not been asked for assistance (the
"innocent" condition).' 7 Regardless of condition, all participants were
then accused of cheating and offered a plea bargain." Participants were
informed that if they did not plead guilty, the case would proceed to a
"trial" before an Academic Review Board (ARB).1 9 If found guilty before
the ARB, the punishment would be more severe than if they accepted the
bargain and confessed. 2 0 After weighing their options, eighty-nine
percent of the participants in the "guilty" condition took the deal and pled
guilty to the charges of academic misconduct.21 Over fifty-six percent of
the participants in the "innocent" condition also took the deal and, in their
cases, falsely confessed to the charges of academic misconduct.2 2
Importantly, the data from this research supports the hypothesis that plea
bargaining's innocence issue is not limited to isolated cases like Brian
Banks. Rather, it appears plea bargaining's innocence issue may be much
larger than originally perceived.2 3
The many contributing factors and potential solutions to plea
bargaining's innocence issue are too numerous to examine here. Plea
bargaining, however, as illustrated above, is an important piece of the
modem innocence debate and was the subject that prompted the 2015
innocence discussion. In the essays that follow, several others who

innocence); Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence
ofPlea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem, 21 CURRENT RES. Soc. PSYCHOL. 14 (2013) (same).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Dervan & Edkins, supra note 12, at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.

17. Id. at 29-30. Only two participants who were approached to offer assistance refused.

Id. at 29
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

n.168. Both of those participants were removed from the study. Id.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See id. at 36.
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participated in the roundtable share their perspectives on various nuances
and facets of the issue of innocence.
Professor Richard Leo begins the collection with an analysis of the
shifting meaning of "innocence" in American scholarship over the last
few decades. His analysis of the concepts of "factual innocence" and
"exoneration" sets the stage for the innocence issues discussed in the
remaining pieces. As Professor Leo states in his essay, "How we define
innocence and classify wrongful convictions matters, both empirically
and normatively." 24
Professor Meghan Ryan's essay delves into the issue of the reliability
of evidence and tactics during criminal proceedings and discusses the
relationship between these concerns and wrongful convictions. Professor
Ryan argues that those involved in the criminal justice system must
"recognize and embrace their own fallibility." Through such a
recognition, she argues, a more critical examination of the system might
occur. 25

Professor Valena Beety examines the issue of scientific evidence and
argues that wrongful convictions reveal significant issues regarding a
"disconnect between forensic experts and officers of the court on
scientific understanding and scientific ignorance." In particular,
Professor Beety discusses several examples of unreliable scientific
evidence being admitted against defendants with little challenge from the
bench or bar because of a "gap in knowledge." 26
Professor Gregory Gilchrist returns the discussion to plea bargaining
and discusses the role of prosecutors and prosecutorial discretion in plea
bargaining's innocence issue. In an attempt to add greater transparency
and accountability to the plea-bargaining machine, Professor Gilchrist
proposes creating a public-review platform for the prosecutorial function.
He writes, "If nothing else, exposure sustains public deliberation that
itself might lead to better practices over time."27
Finally, Professor William Berry examines how we might better learn
from wrongful convictions and how we might better move forward after
injustice is discovered. Professor Berry offers a restorative model of
punishment as a means of addressing both goals while still "hold[ing]
individuals who contribute to wrongful convictions accountable." Such a
model, argues Professor Berry, will create a mechanism for the
wrongfully convicted to express themselves, for those involved in the
conviction to offer an apology, and for the system as a whole to learn
from the mistakes that have led to innocence issues. 2 8
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part I.
infra Part II.
infra Part III.
infra Part IV.
infra Part V.
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Through these diverse and innovative essays, the reader is able to
glimpse the larger innocence discussion that occurred at the roundtable
event in 2015. The ideas expressed in these pages begin ajoumey into an
issue with many faces and many paths forward for discussion, research,
and reform.
I.

WHAT INNOCENCE MEANS TODAY AND WHY IT MATTERS 29

RichardA. Leo
In 1989, David Vasquez and Gary Dotson were, respectively, the first
and second American prisoners to be exonerated by forensic DNA
testing. 30 A quarter of a century later, more than 340 innocent men and
women have been released from prison sentences after being exculpated
by post-conviction DNA testing, including almost two dozen individuals
from death row.31 The use of DNA to establish factual innocence in case
after case has dramatically changed the landscape of American criminal
justice. Among other things, it "has shattered the myth of infallibility," 32
created "innocence consciousness,"33 and inspired a number of policy
reforms at the local, state, and national level designed to reduce the
likelihood of future wrongful convictions. 34 The DNA exoneration cases,
and the sustained media coverage many of them have received for over
two decades, have also given rise to an innocence movement that has now
become international. 35 Some scholars have gone so far as to describe the
innocence revolution in American criminal justice as the "civil rights
movement of the twenty-first century," 36 though others have disputed this
categorization. 3 7
American scholarship on the wrongful conviction of the innocent
predates the use of forensic post-conviction DNA testing by more than a
half-century. 38 Yale Law School professor Edwin Borchard is typically
29. ©2016 by Richard A. Leo. All Rights Reserved.
30. Keith Findley, Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American CriminalJustice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 5 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).

31. Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
32. Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1208 (2011).
33. Marvin Zalman, An IntegratedJustice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV.
1465, 1484 (2011).
34. Robert J. Norris, The "New Civil Rights": The Innocence Movement and American
Criminal Justice (May 2, 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Albany) (on file
with author).
35. Findley, supra note 30, at 5.
36. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2008).
37. See Norris, supra note 34, at 204-224.
38. See Findley, supra note 30, at 4 (explaining that the first DNA exoneration cases
occurred in 1989).
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credited with starting the empirical study of wrongful convictions with his
1932 book Convicting the Innocent, which described sixty-five cases of
individuals who had been convicted but were subsequently proven
factually innocent. 3 9 Following Borchard's blueprint, subsequent writers
and scholars of wrongful conviction also focused only on cases of
completely factually innocent individuals. This included Erle Stanley
40
Gardner's The Court ofLast Resort (1952) [eighteen cases], Barbara and
41
Jerome Frank's Not Guilty (1957) thirty-four cases], Edward Radin's
The Innocents (1964) [eighty cases], 2 and a chapter by Hugo Bedau in The
Death Penalty in America (1964) [seventy-four cases]. 43 In 1987,
Professors Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet published the largest
compilation of wrongful conviction cases in the pre-DNA era-350
(capital and potentially capital) cases in America from 1900 to 1985.44 Like
those before them, Bedau and Radelet focused only on factual innocencei.e., "wrong man" errors, which they contrasted with "due process"
errors. 4 5
Although many cases of wrongful conviction were documented and
written about by scholars, journalists, lawyers, and others in the pre-DNA
era, these cases were either ignored or treated as individual tragedies, or oneoffs, rather than as illustrative of a criminal justice system that was
structurally and persistently prone to factual error. The DNA exoneration
cases in the 1990s and 2000s, of course, changed everything. When Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld conceived the Innocence Project and the use of
post-conviction DNA testing to free the wrongly convicted, however, they
were conceptually part of the tradition of innocence scholarship and activism
from Borchard to Bedau and Radelet. 4 6 Scheck and Neufeld's focus was also
exclusively on "wrong man" errors or actual innocence, the title of their bestselling 2000 book.47 To this end, they introduced into the American lexicon
the concept of a DNA exoneration, carefully making it synonymous with
proof of actual innocence.4 8
39. EDwIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (depicting cases where the
innocent were wrongly accused).
40. ERLE STANLEY GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (rev. ed. 1954).

41.
42.
43.
PENALTY
44.

JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964).
Hugo A. Bedau, Murder, Errors of Justice, and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH
IN AMERICA 434, 438 (1964).
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially

CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 23-24 app. A (1987).
45. See id. at 42.
46. See FrequentlyAsked Questions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/

inpr/faqs/what-is-the-innocence-project-how-did-it-get-started (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
47. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER

DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED, at xv-xvii (2000).
48. As Keith Findley said: "[T]he Innocence Project's list of DNA exonerees is a carefully

guarded list that does not admit everyone whose conviction has been erased, even if the case
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But an exoneration ordinarily is not proof of factual innocence, with
or without the use of post-conviction DNA testing.4 9 An individual may
be factually innocent but never be exonerated (e.g., if an individual was
wrongfully convicted for a crime that never occurred or was committed
by someone else but was never released from prison), just as an individual
may be exonerated (e.g., declared blameless by the criminal justice
system) but be factually guilty.so Yet in the last decade, the term
"exoneration" appears to have become virtually synonymous with factual
innocence to most scholars, even in cases not involving DNA testing and
exculpation. 5 ' As factual innocence is being replaced by a narrow
definition of legal exoneration that is a proxy for factual innocence, the
meaning of innocence has shifted in American scholarship. This shift is
important for understanding the causes, consequences, and scope of the
problem of wrongful conviction, as well as for more informed policy
discussions.
To my knowledge, the first use of the term "exoneration" as a proxy
for factual innocence absent DNA occurred in 1993, when the Death
Penalty Information Center in Washington, D.C., prepared a
congressional report on the risks of executing the innocent. The report
included a compilation of cases from the prior twenty years in which
death row inmates had been released from prison following an
acknowledgement of their innocence. 5 2 Although it turned to the research
of Bedau and Radelet, the Death Penalty Information Center replaced
Bedau and Radelet's definition, or classification, of actual innocence with
the idea of an exoneration, which it defined as follows:
Defendants must have been convicted, sentenced to death
and subsequently eithera. Been acquitted of all charges related to the crime that
placed them on death row, or
b. Had all charges related to the crime that placed them on
death row dismissed by the prosecution, or

includes favorable DNA evidence. Rather that list ...

admits only those whose convictions have

been overturned primarilyon the basis of DNA evidence, and where the DNA conclusively proves

innocence." Findley, supra note 32, at 1187 (footnote omitted).
49. See id at 1160-61.
50. See id
51. See id. at 1158-61.
52. Norris, supra note 34, at 80-87, 98-119.
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c. Been granted a complete pardon based on evidence of
innocence. 53
The Death Penalty Information Center classified a case fitting these
criteria as an "exoneration" because the prisoner's presumption of
innocence was effectively restored by the erasure of his initial capital
conviction, which, it argued, had thus been wrongful.5 4 According to the
Death Penalty Information Center, the defendant was innocent because
the legal system had cleared him of the crime that had sent him to death
row.5 5 The Death Penalty Information Center's list of exonerations were
thus based not on a demonstration offactual innocence but on an erasure
of a preexisting conviction that restored the defendant's legal
presumption of innocence. In redefining innocence, the Death Penalty
Information Center believed it was replacing "subjective judgments"
with "objective criteria,"56 even though its definition of a death penalty
"exoneration" clearly reflected its own value choices and judgments.
The list of DNA exonerations maintained by the Innocence Project
(since 1992) and the list of death penalty exonerations maintained by
Death Penalty Information Center (since 1993) were, "for most of the last
twenty years, the most oft-cited and 'official' of the exoneration lists."57
In 2005, Professor Samuel Gross and his colleagues effectively merged
these two lists in their influential law review article, Exonerationsin the
United States, 1989 through 2003, analyzing 340 exonerations in the
DNA era.5 8 However, Gross's criteria for what constituted an exoneration
more closely tracked the Death Penalty Information Center's. 9 Like the
list maintained by the Death Penalty Information Center, Gross's list was
based on the idea of a legal exoneration-an erasure of a preexisting
conviction.60 But Gross adds that the legal reversal must be based on
some new evidence of innocence, though he does not specify what counts
as new evidence of innocence or how much is necessary.61 Indeed, Gross
and his colleagues noted, "Needless to say, we are in no position to reach
53. Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
(emphasis omitted) http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last

visited Sept. 14, 2016).
54. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH

PENALTY (2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-crisis-american-death-penalty#S

ecO5a.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Norris, supra note 34, at 135.
58. Samuel Gross et al., Exonerationsin the UnitedStates, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005).
59. See id. at 524; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 54.
60. See sources cited supra note 59.
61. See Gross et al., supra note 58, at 524 n.4.
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an independent judgment on the factual innocence of each defendant in
our data," though they only counted among their exonerations legal
erasures of preexisting convictions that were accompanied by some new
evidence of innocence. 62
Building on his 2005 study, Gross, along with Rob Warden, in May
2012 launched the National Registry of Exonerations-an online
database of exonerations in the United States since 1989 that is housed at
the University of Michigan Law School-with nearly 900 cases. 63 It now
lists 1,825 cases.64 In little more than three years, the National Registry
has become the authoritative source on wrongful convictions in our era,
dwarfing the Innocence Project's current list of 342 DNA exonerations.6 5
For 2015, the National Registry currently lists more than five times as
many non-DNA exonerations as DNA exonerations, and the ratio
continues to grow. 66 It has become the largest "official" database of
American wrongful convictions. 67 The National Registry's definition of
an exoneration for the most part tracks the definition provided in Samuel
Gross and colleagues' 2005 article, but the Registry's definition is
slightly more expansive. 68
62. Id. at 524, 526.
63. About the Registry, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/speciall

exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
64. Id.
65. See id.; Exonerate the Innocent, supra note 31.
66. See Exonerationsby Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Sept.

14, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx.
67. Wendy Hundley, New National DatabaseAnalyzes Reasons for Wrongful Convictons,
DALLAS MORNINGNEWS (May 20,2012, 10:39PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/communitynews/dallas/headlines/20120520-new-national-database-analyzes-reasons-for-wrongful-conviction
s.ece/.

68. According to their website:
In general, an exoneration occurs when a person who has been convicted of a

crime is officially cleared based on new evidence of innocence.
A more precise definition follows.
Exoneration-A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a
crime and later was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government

official or agency with the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of
all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body
with the authority to take that action. The official action may be: (i) a complete
pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the pardon is

designated as based on innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges factually related
to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a dismissal of
all charges related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted, by
a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that dismissal. The pardon,
acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at least in part, of evidence of

2016]

VOICES ON INNOCENCE

1579

How researchers define innocence and classify wrongful convictions
matters, both empirically and normatively. Given the inherent difficulty
of proving a negative, it is very difficult to demonstrate a person's factual
innocence-i.e., that the defendant was the wrong man or that no crime
occurred-to an absolute certainty in many cases. For this reason, it must
be true that the number of proven wrongful convictions of the innocent is
vastly smaller than the number of actual wrongful convictions of the
innocent. 69 Although legal exonerations are not the only or the most
conservative way to study innocence, they are nevertheless a valuable
proxy or indirect measure. The primary advantage of the National
Registry's definition of an exoneration is that it allows researchers access
to a greater amount of valuable data-about the regularity, distribution,
causes, correlations, and consequences of near-certain wrongful
convictions of the innocent-than would otherwise be available if
researchers limited themselves solely to those comparatively few cases in
which they can prove factual innocence to an absolute certainty. There is
a justifiable trade-off here between marginally greater confidence in their
judgment of actual innocence on the one hand (if researchers rely on
proven wrongful convictions exclusively) and substantially more
information about the multifaceted phenomenon of the wrongful
conviction of the innocent on the other (if researchers rely on the
Registry's legal exonerations as a proxy for false convictions).
Moreover, by relying on a legal definition of exonerations, researchers
are able to empirically study patterns and variation in wrongful
convictions more quantitatively and thus more systematically. Moving
away from story-based explanations, which have thus far dominated
much of the literature on wrongful convictions, increases researchers'
ability to generalize.7 0 As the ever-expanding list of DNA exonerations
demonstrated in the 1990s and 2000s, the problem of the wrongful
conviction of the innocent in the American criminal justice system is
persistent and systemic, not merely episodic and aberrational as critics
innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at which the person was
convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to the defendant, the
defense attorney and the court at the time the plea was entered. The evidence of
innocence need not be an explicit basis for the official action that exonerated the
person.
Glossary, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONs, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages

/glossary.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
69. See Gross et al., supra note 58, at 551 ("Any plausible guess at the total number of
miscarriages ofjustice in America in the last fifteen years must be in the thousands, perhaps tens
of thousands.").
70. See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learningfrom

SocialScience, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 10 (2009).
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had mistakenly claimed. 7 1 As the research community is able to
accumulate more systematic and generalizable knowledge about the
factors that contribute to wrongful conviction in the 2010s and beyond,
researchers will be able to gain a better understanding of the nature and
the scope of wrongful convictions in America. Researchers will therefore
be able to provide more empirically informed policy analyses about the
best ways to prevent and minimize wrongful convictions in the future.
11. INNOCENCE IGNORANCE: THE FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
FALLIBILITY AND DIGNITY COMPONENTS OF HUMANITY

Meghan J Ryan
On March 24, 1985, a young female college student from Texas Tech
University was brutally raped.7 2 The primary suspect, Timothy Cole, was
soon picked out of a questionable photo array and charged with
aggravated sexual conduct. At trial, the victim identified Cole as the
perpetrator, and the prosecution also proffered inconclusive serology and
hair analysis testimony. 74 After six hours of deliberation, the jury
convicted Cole, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.7 5
After spending a decade in prison, Cole passed away. 76 Some time later,
another Texas inmate confessed to the rape for which Cole had been
convicted.77 In fact, even while Cole was still alive, this confessor had
admitted to the rape, but this prior confession had received little
attention. 78 On the heels of the later confession, DNA analysis was found
to exculpate Cole and inculpate the confessor. 79 Cole was then legally
exonerated in 2009 and subsequently pardoned in 2010.80 Troublingly, it
seems that Cole spent over a decade in prison-and in fact died in
prison-for a crime he did not commit.
Unfortunately, Cole's story is not unique. There have been at least
1,982 documented wrongful convictions in the United States since

71. See, e.g., Joshua Marquis, The Myth ofInnocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501,

521 (2005) (referring to wrongful convictions as "episodic, not epidemic").
72. Timothy Cole, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-

imprisonment/timothy-cole (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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1989.81 Many of these wrongful convictions have been the products of
false or misleading evidence, while others have resulted from
questionable prosecutorial actions or other curable sources of error. 82 Yet
questionable evidence and tactics continue to penetrate courts across the
country. The FBI recently admitted giving flawed hair analysis testimony
in more than 95% of cases in which hair analysis testimony had been
presented.8 3 The National Academy of Sciences has suggested that the
long-standing method of interpreting fingerprint evidence, which is
routinely used in cementing criminal convictions, has no scientific
basis.84 And the Texas Forensic Science Commission has found that the
arson analysis on which two famous Texas convictions were based-one
resulting in execution-used reasoning that has since been proven
unsound.85 Further, common reactions to the innocence problem include
remaining ignorant of it, denying its existence, or remaining passive in
efforts to address it. The statistics can be paralyzing. But it is important
to acknowledge the enormity of the problem and also recognize that we
do have the capability to better address it. Confronting and attacking the
problem of wrongful conviction requires recognizing the essence of
humanity-both the human dignity of the defendants and the human
fallibility of the legal decision makers who decide their fates.
The many recent examples of wrongful and doubtful convictions are
overwhelming. Some known potential sources of wrongful convictions
have been more readily challenged in recent years. For example, courts
have been willing to admit into evidence expert testimony on the pitfalls
of eyewitness testimony, and some states such as New York and Texas
have established forensic science commissions to remain abreast of
scientific developments affecting forensic evidence used in court. 8 6 But
much of the evidence used to convict criminal defendants could use better
81. See Browse the National Registry of Exonerations, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,

http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
82. See % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx

# (last visited Dec. 23, 2016) (indicating that, out of the 1,949 exonerations, 56% had perjury or
a false accusation as a contributing factor, 24% had false or misleading forensic evidence as a
contributing factor, and 51% had official misconduct as a contributing factor).
83. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBIAdmits Flaws in HairAnalysis Over Decades, WASH. PosT (Apr.
18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-

nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/201 5/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-1 1 e4-b510-962fcfabc3 10_story.
html.
84. See NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 7-8, 142-45 (2009).
85. See TEx. FORENSIC SC. COMM'N, WILLINGHAM/WLLIS INVESTIGATION 13-29 (2011).

86. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995-a (McKinney 2016) (outlining the responsibilities of the
New York Office of Forensic Services); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (West 2016)
(outlining the responsibilities of the Texas Forensic Science Commission).
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factual and scientific support. Despite broad recognition that much of the
evidence presented in criminal trials-from eyewitness testimony, to
arson evidence, to fingerprint evidence-may be unreliable, or at least
that there is no scientific evidence of reliability, 87 there has not been
enough progress in trying to stamp out these possible sources of error at
trial. Further, trial and appellate courts are often skeptical when questions
about the reliability of convicting evidence is raised in post-conviction
proceedings.8 8 There are significant obstacles that convicted defendants
must negotiate if they want to challenge their convictions that have
become final on appeal. 8 9 For example, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 199690 has considerably narrowed the cases in
which convicted defendants may successfully challenge their convictions
on writs of habeas corpus.9 1
When legal decision makers are confronted with all of the concerns
surrounding wrongful and doubtful convictions, they have a variety of
responses. Some judges are eager to learn more. They want to know how
better to screen for reliable scientific evidence and how better to use the
law to prevent the injustice of wrongful conviction. This sometimes leads
them to conduct their own independent research, which may have its own
ethical implications. Other judges deny there is a problem. They
emphasize the small percentage of convicted defendants who have been
exonerated and assert that the fact exonerations have taken place
establishes that there are ways for the system to correct itself if need be.
Still other judges feel overwhelmed or powerless because of the enormity
of the problem, the startling statistics, or the notion that such an injustice
could happen under the orderly rule of law in this country. Indeed,
research suggests that statistics about large numbers of humans
suffering-like the million who were killed in the Rwandan genocide of
1994-have a numbing effect. 9 2 People are more likely to have
87. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. In the context of wrongful conviction,
it is primarily the accuracyof forensic science techniques and evidence that is at issue rather than
the reliability of the techniques and evidence. Because the term "reliability" is more often used
in this context, however, I will continue to use it here with the understanding that it refers to the
less technical understanding of the "[a]bility to be relied on with confidence." Reliability, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009).
88. See Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful

Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1106-09 (2015).
89. See generally Nancy King, The JudicialSystem: Appeals and Post-ConvictionReview,
in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD (Allison D. Redlich

et al. eds., 2014) (examining the efficacy of several avenues available for post-conviction relief).
90. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
91. See Alex Kozinski, Preface, CriminalLaw 2.0,44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at
iii, xli-xlii (2015).
92. See Paul Slovic, "If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and
Genocide, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79, 80 (2007); David Ropeik, StatisticalNumbing:
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compassion for, and respond to, the single story of a suffering individual
than hundreds of thousands who were unjustly killed in the same way. 93
The story of Timothy Cole may resonate more with the public, and thus
have greater power, than reciting that there may be thousands of people
unjustly behind bars today.
To better protect innocent persons in the criminal justice system,
judges and other legal decision makers must recognize and embrace their
own fallibility. They are human and will thus occasionally make
mistakes. As integral components of the criminal justice system, though,
these decision makers do have the power to change things. But change
will require a cultural shift. Legal decision makers must be open to
possible defects within the system-including the evidence on which
convictions are based and even the appellate standards of review. They
must also be willing to embrace what science and experience tell us. Just
because fingerprint evidence has been relied upon for hundreds of years,
for example, does not necessarily mean that it constitutes reliable
evidence. Legal decision makers will also need to harness their power
and push for change. If legal decision makers are competent in their
understandings of the problems within the system and also confident that
they are correct in those assessments, they have the power to create
change. In fact, legal decision makers-especially judges-may have the
greatest power of any player in this regard. They are legal insiders and
are trusted to safeguard the integrity of the system for the rest of society.
For change to occur, it is also important that judges and other legal
decision makers recognize that, even if the percentage of individuals
wrongfully convicted is small,9 4 wrongful conviction is still an enormous
problem. Surely, as recognized by the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule,
certainty of guilt would be an impossible standard. 95 Certainty is
unobtainable. But imprisoning-or worse, executing-an innocent
individual, no matter how rare that might be, is abominable. To lock up
individuals and throw away the keys-to stop thinking about them as
human beings-is problematic. This is true even for the most serious
offenders who have committed the most heinous of crimes. Not only is it
inconsistent with basic principles of morality, but it contravenes the
human dignity principle of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
Why

Millions Can Die and We Don't Care, PYSCHOL.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/how-risky-is-it-really/
millions-can-die-and-we-don-t-care.

2

TODAY

(Aug.

15,

2011),

01108/statistical-numbing-why-

93. See Ropeik, supra note 92.
94. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
95. Cf Findley, supra note 32, at 1162 (arguing that "to demand certainty [of factual

innocence] is to demand the impossible, and that, in the end, the best we can or should do is rely
on the legal standards that define guilt and, absent proof of guilt, presume innocence").
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and unusual punishments. 96 As the Supreme Court has stated time and
time again: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man." 97 These are people. It does matter
if an innocent individual is behind bars. Although certainty may not be
obtainable, what is obtainable is trying to make convictions as reliable as
possible. This means basing convictions on only reliable evidence and
maintaining high ethical standards for prosecutors and defense attorneys.
Human dignity and fallibility are two important cornerstones for the
innocence movement. Individualized critical analyses-of facts,
evidence, and cognitive and implicit biases-are essential to preserving
these values. Only when we embrace these foundations of reliability in
criminal convictions can we begin to effectively address the serious
problem of wrongful convictions.
III. FORENSIC IGNORANCE ON TRIAL

Valena E. Beety
"[S]cience is a courtfrom which there is no appeal. "98
Recently, a New York Times op-ed argued the case for teaching about
ignorance-scientific ignorance. 99 The two words read as incongruent,
and not simply to lay people. The op-ed describes medical students who
study and memorize diagrams, descriptions, and definitions-a robust
background of scientific information.100 What the young doctors fail to
learn, however, is how much remains unknown, even for scientists and
physicians.101

Identifying gaps in knowledge is particularly vital for scientific
disciplines, which are often assumed to be impartial and all-knowing.
Courts in particular rely on scientific findings for conclusive results and
impartiality. It is no surprise, therefore, that a lack of scientific
questioning has led directly to wrongful convictions in the American
criminal justice system. 102 These wrongful convictions highlight two
96. See Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth

Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129,2168-73 (2016).
97. Eg., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 311 (2002)).
98. Tom Wolfe, Sorry, but Your Soul Just Died, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 1, 1997), http://www.ind
ependent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/sorry-but-your-soul-just-died-1276509.html.
99. Jamie Holmes, The Case for Teaching Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/opinion/the-case-for-teaching-ignorance.html.
100. See id.
101. See id. As University of Arizona surgery professor Marlys Witte notes in the article,
"Textbooks spend 8 to 10 pages on pancreatic cancer ... without ever telling the student that we
just don't know very much about it." Id
102. See Hsu, supra note 83.
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primary problems with the disconnect between forensic experts and
officers of the court on scientific understanding and scientific ignorance.
This essay will discuss two interrelated issues: the lack of standard
protocols and standardized language in forensic disciplines, and the
exacerbation of this problem by court officers who encourage simplified
language, leading witnesses to misrepresent their findings.
The National Academy of Sciences criticized the lack of standard
protocols for forensic disciplines in its pivotal 2009 report, Strengthening
03
ForensicScience in the United States: A Path Forward(NAS Report).
Of the many forensic disciplines, only one was found infallible and was
using a repeatable, cognizable standard of operation: DNA testing.1 0 4
When disciplines lack a standard operating procedure, no evidence exists
to show the repeatability of a procedure, no established population pool
exists to compare results, and no validation studies exist to support the
effectiveness of the technique. 0 5 In short, the lack of knowledge-or
ignorance-is palpable across forensic disciplines.
Does the accuracy and consistency of forensic findings justify what is
presented in the courtroom? Forensic odontology, or bite-mark analysis,
offers an example of how an unregulated, nonstandardized field can
produce faulty findings that are used to wrongfully convict innocent men
and women.1 0 6 Forensic odontology is generally admitted in the
courtroom to determine if marks on skin are human bite marks, and then
to "match" those markings to a suspect's teeth mold.10 7 With no standard
(even when the American Board of Forensic odontology conducted their
own internal study in 2015), forensic odontologists fail to agree on
whether a marking is even a human bite mark. 0 8 This failure to make a
consistent determination means a marking is likewise not unique enough
to identify an individual.1 09 With no consistent method of determination,
and no consistent validation of a method, markings cannot be reliably
identified as human bite marks let alone matched to a suspect."1 0 Despite
its unreliability, prosecutors have used bite-mark evidence to wrongfully

103. See NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis., supra note 84, at 6.

104. See id. at 87.
105. See id. at 12-13.
106. See id. at 173-74.
107. See id.; Steven Weigler, Bite Mark Evidence: Forensic Odontology and the Law, 2
HEALTH MATRIX 303, 304, 312 (1992).
108. See Radley Balko, A Bite Mark Matching Advocacy GroupJust Conducteda Study That
DiscreditsBite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpo
st.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/04/08/a-bite-mark-matching-advocacy-group-just-conducted-a-st

udy-that-discredits-bite-mark-evidence/.
109. See id.
110. See id
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convict individuals nationally, most notably: Kennedy Brewer, t"' Levon
Brooks,' 12 Leigh Stubbs,11 3 Tammy Vance,1 14 and Robert Lee Stinson."1
This unreliable evidence continues to be used and admitted in the
courtroom today. 1 1 6
Yet the admittance of unreliable forensic evidence in the courtroom,
often without challenge, is only part of the problem. Prosecutors seek to
dumb down findings from many forensic disciplines, ultimately
misrepresenting results. The NAS Report found that no forensic
discipline, except nuclear DNA analysis, could "consistently and with a
high degree of certainty" make a match or "individualization."1 1 7 And yet
a "match" is precisely the language often used to describe such findings
by prosecutors in the courtroom.11 8 Even with DNA evidence, a recent
study has shown the majority of wrongful DNA matches and errors
originated in the post-analytical stage-when the experts were
explaining the reports.119
Forensic disciplines can be extremely valuable in eliminating
suspects. They are less reliable, however, in directly implicating a
particular defendant. Nevertheless, prosecutors may push for exact-match
language from an expert, leading the expert to say the hair belonged to
I 11. Two Innocent Men Cleared Today in Separate Murder Cases in Mississippi, 15 Years
After Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Feb. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.innocen
ceproject.org/two-innocent-men-cleared-today-in-separate-murder-cases-in-mississippi- 15-years
-after-wrongful-convictions/.

112. Id.
113. Two Mississippi Women Freed After Review of Bite Mark Evidence, INNOCENCE

PROJECT (July 2,2012,4:45 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/two-mississippi-women-freed
-after-review-of-bite-mark-evidence/.

114. Id
115. Robert Lee Stinson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-

imprisonment/robert-lee-stinson (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
116. See Radley Balko, The Path Forwardon Bite Mark Matching-andthe Rearview Mirror,
WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp

/2015/02/20/the-path-forward-on-bite-mark-matching-and-the-rearview-mirror/.

Indeed, Robert

Stinson's wrongful conviction created the national standard of general acceptance of bite mark evidence,

still relied on by courts today in admitting bite mark evidence. See State v. Stinson, 397 N.W.2d 136,
140 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that "bite mark identification evidence presented by an
expert witness can be a valuable aid to a jury in understanding and interpreting evidence in a

criminal trial"); see, e.g., Starks v. City of Waukegan, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(citing Stinson, 397 N.W.2d at 137-40) (noting that "state courts have regularly accepted bite
mark evidence").
117. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIs., supra note 84, at 87.
118. See Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse ofScientific Evidence by Prosecutors,28 OKLA. CITY

U. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2003).
119. Ate Kloosterman, Frameworkfor Registration, ClassificationandEvaluation ofErrors
in the Forensic DNA Typing Process, NEDERLANDS FORENSISCH INSTITUUT (May 28, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/forensics/upload/Kloosterman-DNA.pdf.
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the defendant, that the expert is 100% positive in the match, or even that
there is no way the hair could have matched any other person but the
defendant.12o While such language is persuasive to a jury and acceptable
to ajudge, it has been proven to be scientifically inaccurate. Worse, when
defense attorneys-like prosecutors-fail to understand the nuances of
forensic science disciplines and reports, exact-match testimony is
admitted without so much as a challenge.
The FBI has recently conceded how its own scientists' faulty
testimonial rhetoric wrongfully convicted individuals.121 In reopening
hundreds of hair-analysis cases, the FBI revealed that its analysts testified
far beyond the scope of the science, falsely testifying to exact matches.1 2 2
Simplified exact matches are what juries want to hear, prosecutors want
to produce, courts are willing to accept, and defense attorneys rarely
challenge. Yet this overblown, faulty language wrongfully convicts
individuals in the American criminal justice system. Questionable results
are misrepresented as accurate, reliable, and impartial, and then accepted
as such by jurors and judges alike.
Forensic scientists themselves have responded to reliability
challenges by working to strengthen the accuracy of their disciplines. In
2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology established
twenty-three Organization of Scientific Area Committees (SACs) to
research the reliability of forensic disciplines and methods, conduct
validation studies of these methods and techniques, and create a standard
operating procedure for each specific forensic discipline.' 2 3 In addition to
newly created standards of operation, forensic scientists must also
consistently describe their findings in reports.
Notably, consistent language in reports can assist courts in
understanding the value, accuracy, reliability, and importance of forensic
findings. Terminology can vary across reports, inadvertently heightening
the communication barrier between forensic experts and attorneys. In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,12 4 the Supreme Court refused to allow
a lab report to stand on its own as courtroom evidence, instead requiring
a lab technician to testify to the results, thus reducing the possible
manipulation or misinterpretation of report findings.1 2 5 Having the
analyst testify to the results is seen as a protective measure. Yet until
120. See Gershman, supra note 118, at 28-34.
121. Hsu, supra note 83.
122. See Stephen S. Hsu, After FBIAdmits OverstatingForensicHairMatches, Focus Turns
to Cases, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-fbiadmits-overstating-forensic-hair-matches-focus-tums-to-cases/2015/04/20/a846aca8-e766-1 le4-

9a6a-c1ab95a0600bstory.html.
123. See OSAC Subcommittees, NAT'L INST. STANDARDS
http://www.nist.gov/forensics/osac/subs.cfin.

124. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
125. Id. at 311.

& TECH. (Oct. 29, 2015),
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courtroom officers demand nuance in scientific testimony and
acknowledge the unknown in scientific determinations, even reliable
forensic findings will be misrepresented.
The gaps in knowledge in forensic science should be an exciting
challenge, much like the challenges presented by gaps in other sciences.
But ignoring scientific ignorance leads to the willfully blind use of faulty
evidence to wrongfully convict defendants. By both establishing
standards and reliability metrics for forensic disciplines and
standardizing the language in reports, forensic science can be made
reliable-and thus useful in the courtroom. For that evidence to then be
accurately presented, lawyers and scientists need to acknowledge the
limits of the science, accept and appreciate the nuance of findings, and
use the results to their utmost ability, but not beyond. With these steps,
the American criminal justice system can avoid the harrowing result of
misrepresentation by either science or the court: wrongful convictions.
IV.

REVIEWING THE PROSECUTION

Gregory M Gilchrist
This brief essay isolates and considers two variables in the innocence
problem: unchecked prosecutorial discretion and unregulated plea
bargaining. It tentatively suggests a mechanism to address the former.
A. ProsecutorsHave Nearly Unlimited Discretion over Plea
Bargaining
Few government actors exercise as much power over the lives of
others as prosecutors. Prosecutors decide whether to seek charges, what
charges to seek, whether to offer leniency, how much leniency to offer,
how to try a case, and what sentence to request upon conviction. This
discretion is as unchecked as it is broad.1 26 The courts view prosecutorial
decisions with extreme deference.1 27 Elections fail to provide a
meaningful check.1 28 Internal checks, such as the Office of Professional
Responsibility, seem largely ineffective. 129 And rules of professional
conduct are limited in scope and even more limited in application. 13 0
126. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 870-75 (2009); Ronald F. Wright,
Beyond ProsecutorElections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 595 (2014).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
128. See Wright, supra note 126, at 600-04.
129. Kozinski, supra note 91, at xxxii ("In my experience, the U.S. Justice Department's
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) seems to view its mission as cleaning up the
reputation of prosecutors who have gotten themselves into trouble.").
130. See David Keenan et al., The Myth of ProsecutorialAccountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 205 (2011).
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There is something troubling about entrusting individuals with
expansive and largely ungoverned power over charging decisions. Who
loses life and liberty at the hands of the state is largely determined by
individual discretion. Such a condition is, if nothing else, at odds with the
rule of law and subject to abuse.
B. Plea BargainingExacerbates the Innocence Problem
As I have argued elsewhere, given sufficient disparities between postplea sentences and post-trial sentences, the effective burden of proof for
the prosecution can be reduced to mere probable cause.13 1 If we imagine
a prosecutor who could credibly threaten a death sentence after trial,
while offering a fine of fifty cents if the defendant pleads guilty, it is
difficult to imagine a rational defendant risking trial.' 3 2 Even were the
prosecution's case extremely weak, risking death to avoid a conviction
and a fifty-cent fine would be, in most cases, foolhardy. Given a sufficient
trial penalty, rational defendants will be forced to plead guilty, even if
they are in fact innocent.1 33 In that case, the charging decision is the only
check on the prosecution, and the only limit on that decision is probable
cause. 134 Accordingly, with mere probable cause, the prosecutor can
secure a conviction in almost all cases.
Of course, in the American legal system there are no sentencing
disparities as great as that imagined above. No one is forced to risk death
to dispute a fine. There are, however, extraordinary trial penalties. It is
not uncommon in federal gun and drug cases for a defendant to face posttrial sentences of ten, twenty, thirty years, or even life, while being
offered a plea agreement likely to result in a sentence of only a few years
in prison.1 3 5 In these cases, too, there is a real risk that rational defendants
will be compelled to plead guilty, even where the prosecution's case is
weak. And, again, this risk applies equally to the guilty and the innocent.
Widespread and unregulated plea bargaining has significantly diluted
the protection inherent in the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
requirement. Very few cases are tested by this standard. Defendants plead
guilty and some of those defendants are innocent.
The dangers of plea bargaining are elevated by unchecked
prosecutorial discretion. The charging decision is frequently outcome
determinative. Since that decision is unchecked, little more than trust
separates citizens from wrongful convictions generated by wrongful
charges and coercive pleas.
131. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REv. 609, 632 (2016).
132. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CI. L. REV. 3, 13 n.24

(1978).
133. See Rakoff, supra note 1.

134. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
135. See US: Forced Guilty Pleas in Drug Cases, HUMAN RTs. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/05/us-forced-guilty-pleas-drug-cases.
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C. Rating Prosecutors
Accountability matters. Insofar as institutional forms of review have
failed to provide accountability, scholars are left searching for an
alternative. What about public review? Professor Ronald Wright has
recently proposed developing a rating system of prosecutors, to develop
a feedback loop between prosecutors and their communities. 13 6 He
envisions an independent entity, such as a news organization, gathering
objective data on prosecutorial practices and publishing a Prosecutor
Quality Index.1 3 7 Data points might include conviction rates, convictionas-charged rates, and acquittal rates.13 8 The study and publication of
prosecutorial practices would bring attention to practices, generate public
deliberation, and serve as a check against prosecutorial excesses. 139
Professor Wright's proposal presents a potential solution to-or at least
mitigation of-what has long seemed the insurmountable problem of
prosecutorial discretion.
What if this idea, however, were democratized? Technological shifts
have already introduced new tools for regulating prosecutors. In a
forthcoming article, Professors Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky make
a compelling case that a new age of prosecutorial accountability has
arrived that could not have been achieved "without the aggregation,
accessibility, and communication of data and commentary about
prosecutorial misconduct that new information technology makes readily
available to the public."l4 0
Technology introduces the possibility of a radical new form of
prosecutorial review. Rather than a centralized and objective review,
what if prosecutors were subject to a more public review? Social media
allows the public to review hotels, restaurants, professors, and even
government agencies online.141 Why not prosecutors? If the public could
review the prosecutorial function, might not that review have the same
salutary effects envisioned by Professor Wright?
It's hard to know. First, there is the question of what the dataset would
look like. Who would review prosecutors? A truly open review platform
would likely degenerate into complaints-both valid and invalid-by
those convicted by a prosecutor. Such a dataset would have limited, if
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Wright, supra note 126, at 608-13.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 615.

140. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://ssm.com/abstract-2722791.
141. See Lisa Rein, The FederalGovernment Wants You to Review It on Yelp, WASH. POST

(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/08/18/the-federalgovernment-wants-you-to-review-it-on-yelp/.
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any, informational value. Perhaps the most promising possibility would
be a review platform on which only defense counsel with professional
interactions with a particular prosecutor could generate reviews, but on
which completed reviews would be completely public.1 4 2
Were such a platform to generate a robust set of data, one could
imagine any number of audiences. Prosecutors would themselves likely
be interested. Defense attorneys confronting a prosecutor for the first time
would benefit from the experience of other attorneys. Judges may wish
to learn more about the lawyers bringing cases in their courtrooms. Law
firms would likely review the data when hiring out of prosecutors'
offices. And one might even imagine senior officials at the Department
of Justice or other prosecutorial agencies considering the reviews when
making promotion decisions. Finally, the public would learn more about
prosecutors and the prosecutorial function.
One might object that reviews by defense counsel would surely be
biased. But bias does not render reviews unhelpful, especially when the
bias is plain. Yes, everyone would know that defense lawyers were
reviewing their adversaries. The value would develop as disparities
between prosecutors became pronounced. Consider, as an example, a
platform allowing ratings for:
*

"Procedural Fairness" (e.g., provides Jencks before
trial, has a tendency toward open file discovery, is
respectful of appointed counsel's need to develop
rapport with client, et cetera)

*

"Ethical Conduct"
obligations)

*

"Outcome Fairness / Harshness" (an assessment of
plea agreement and sentencing practices).

(compliance

with

ethical

Any one review would have little informational value. But as means
and extremes developed, the patterns might be useful. Some prosecutors
are more fair, ethical, or decent, than others.1 4 3 Simply observing the
disparity would have an impact. The question remains, what impact
would it have?
One possibility is that those prosecutors who received low scores or
who were the subject of harsh narrative reviews would change their
142. There are significant hurdles any such project would face. The fundamental challenge
lies in dual needs to limit access for authoring reviews to actual defense lawyers with personal
knowledge of the prosecutor, while at the same time providing absolute anonymity to the

reviewers. This challenge is basically a technical one and beyond the scope of this brief Essay,
except to suggest that the solutions themselves may also be technical.
143. Yes, the same could be said of defense lawyers, police officers, law professors, or any
other group.
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practices for the better or face limited career advancement. Equally
possible: those who received positive scores or reviews would change
their practices for the worse or face limited career advancement. Which
of these possibilities is more likely would depend largely on the culture
of the relevant audience. In an office that highly values professionalism
and the prosecutor's special role, as not merely an advocate but a servant
of justice, there would be pressure to maintain decent review scores (or,
at least to avoid being a negative outlier). Yet in an office that highly
values winning over all else, there might be pressure not to be perceived
as soft or weak.
That we cannot predict the exact impact of a public review of the
prosecution does not demand the conclusion that such a project lacks
value. First, more information about government function is usually
better than less. Professors Wright, Green, Yaroshefsky, and others are
correct to see the value inherent in increased exposure of and attention to
prosecutorial practices. 144 If nothing else, exposure sustains public
deliberation that itself might lead to better practices over time. Second,
most prosecutors do value their special role as servants of justice. While
there are exceptions, and the prosecutor's vision of justice does not
always align with defense counsel's, I harbor cautious optimism that
heightened exposure would lead to better behavior. And given the dearth
of other reviewing bodies, the public may represent the best check against
the otherwise unchecked prosecutorial function.

V.

RESTORATIVE INNOCENCE

William W Berry III
"It is better to risk saving a guilty man than to condemn an innocent
one. " -Voltaire
The long-held sentiment with respect to the judging of those accused
of criminal acts is that, all things being equal, it is better to let a guilty
man go free than imprison an innocent man. 145 To be sure, the American
criminal justice system provides for the presumption of innocence and
places the burden on the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
And yet, the discovery of innocent individuals in American prisons
has reached epidemic proportions,1 4 6 with more than 125 individuals
144. See supra notes 136, 140 and accompanying text.

145. Blackstone similarly said, "It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer." Words of Justice: Roof Garden Wall - Right Panel, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR.,
http://library.1aw.harvard.eduL/justicequotes/explore-the-room/south-4/
(last visited Sept. 14,

2016).
146. One study identified more than 1,800 exonerations since 1989. See About the Registry,
supra note 63.
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exonerated in the past year alone.1 47 The availability of DNA evidence in
part explains this phenomenon, although it does not make it any less
disturbing.1 4 8
In recent years, a number of studies have shed light on the reasons for
these failings.1 4 9 The hope of such studies is to understand why these
errors occur and to assess how to deter such mistakes in the future.
Interestingly, there is a wide range of conduct-some intentional, some
negligent, some coincidental-that leads to false convictions.
In addition to understanding why such errors occur, creating
consequence for such failings seems necessary. The problem with the
status quo is that there are few, if any, accountability measures for police,
prosecutors, state forensic scientists, expert witnesses, eyewitnesses,
jurors, and others whose decision-making contributed to the erroneous
conviction of an innocent individual.so Even so, the absence of punitive
measures makes some sense, as allowing criminal punishment of such
actors would have a chilling effect, hampering their ability to do their
jobs effectively.
This short paper proposes a remedy to this conundrum by introducing
a different form of accountability for actors who bear some responsibility
for conviction of innocent individuals-implementation of restorativejustice principles. As explained below, this approach helps those who
have made mistakes understand the consequences of their actions and
provides a public response on behalf of the falsely accused.
Instead of punishing a criminal offender by imprisonment to exercise
the retributive power of the state, restorative justice, generally speaking,
seeks to sanction the criminal offender through a process of reintegrative
shaming. In such a proceeding, the victim meets with the offender in the
presence of the local community. The victim communicates to the
offender the pain and suffering caused by the offender's actions. In some
cases, others from the community can also voice their displeasure or
contempt for the actions of the offender.
147. See Mark Berman, Record Number of Exonerations in the US., Report Says, WASH.
POST (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/01/29/recordnumber-of-exonerations-in-the-u-s-report-says/.
148. There have been more than 330 DNA exonerations. DNA Exonerations Nationwide,
INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2016, 11:42 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/freeinnocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide.
149. See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (examining the first
250 exoneration cases); Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate ofFalse Conviction ofCriminalDefendants
Who Are Sentenced to Death, Ill PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 7230, 7230 (2014) (estimating that
more than 4% of all death row inmates are innocent).

150. Connickv. Thompson illustrates this point. 563 U.S. 51, 54-56, 60-63 (2011)(striking
down a multi-million dollar tort award against prosecutors who hid exonerating DNA evidence
for death row inmate).
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Unlike ordinary sentencing hearings, which involve disintegrative
shaming, the point of the restorative-justice proceeding is not to separate
the offender further from society through condemnation. Rather, the
proceeding aims to reintegrate the offender into society.
After the public shaming, then, the offender has the opportunity to
express remorse for his actions. The offender then asks the victim and the
community for forgiveness for his actions. The community and the victim
then absolve the offender, allowing him to rejoin society. Many find the
process objectionable for serious crimes, as it seems to abandon the hard
punishment that many believe criminal offenders deserve. Interestingly,
restorative justice has proved successful in many contexts, including
those involving serious crimes.' 5 1
Two elements of restorative justice are particularly important-the
ability of the victim to express their feelings toward the offender, and the
offender's opportunity to express remorse toward the victim. A further
consideration is the value of having the involvement of the broader
community in this interaction, both to express condemnation of the
criminal act as well as to offer forgiveness and reintegration into society.
Putting aside whether restorative justice is an effective tool for
responding to criminal offenses, this short paper argues for using these
principles as a means to hold individuals who contribute to wrongful
convictions accountable. This process of "restorative innocence" would
work in much the same way as restorative justice does.
After a court exonerates an individual who had previously been falsely
convicted, a separate proceeding would occur. As judges play a role in
cases of false conviction, creating an independent commission to
administer such a proceeding would be desirable. The restorativeinnocence commission would mandate the attendance of as many of the
individuals who participated in the prior criminal proceeding as possible.
This would include prosecutors, judges, jurors, expert witnesses, other
witnesses, police, and any other individual who played a significant role
in the false conviction.
The first part of the proceeding would be the falsely convicted
individual speaking about his experience from the time of the criminal
incident until exoneration. Having falsely convicted individuals express
their thoughts concerning their experience could be cathartic and offer
closure, particularly if many of those involved were present. It would
likewise have the benefit of allowing those who were involved in the case
to witness the damage caused by their decision-making, irrespective of
151. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH I (Michael Tonry ed., 1999)
(providing evaluation data from numerous restorative-justice sites). For an explanation of the
underlying premises of restorative justice, see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND
REINTEGRATION (1989).

2016]

VOICES ON INNOCENCE

1595

the level of fault they bore for the errors in the process that led to the false
conviction.
The other participants would then have an opportunity to respond,
offering apology and remorse, at least in some cases, to the falsely
convicted. It would also allow those who made mistakes, whether
prosecutors, experts, eyewitnesses, or others, to take responsibility for
their errors. In addition, such a process of restorative innocence would
allow participation of others in the community. These could be family
members of any people involved, local officials, or other interested
members of the community. Allowing their participation would signal to
the criminal justice participants-prosecutor, judge, jury, and othersthat they act as representatives of the state and that their power rests in
the delegation of that authority to them by the larger community.
Finally, a restorative-innocence proceeding would allow for a
conversation concerning what went wrong. While excellent research in
recent years has uncovered many of the reasons for false convictionserroneous eyewitness testimony, faulty forensic science, rushes to
judgment-engaging in a postmortem with all involved could yield
important lessons as well as help deter similar errors in the future,
particularly for repeat actors in the criminal justice system.
At the end of the proceeding, everyone would leave without any
further consequence. In addition, there would be no legal consequence
for admissions or conversations during the proceeding.
To make this model work, there are several logistical hurdles. First,
the state would need to establish an independent restorative-innocence
commission that possessed the power to compel attendance of those
involved. This could work similarly to the subpoena power of courts.
Second, the proceeding would need to provide immunity to all involved
to foster honest discussion, allow for apology and remorse, and create the
possibility for the healing and personal growth of all involved. As such,
the decision to engage in such a proceeding would be the voluntary choice
of the exonerated inmate, as choosing this path would practically forego
any tort lawsuit against the state for the false imprisonment. Third, the
commission would need a strong, experienced mediator to conduct the
proceeding. The ability of this person to foster an open atmosphere is
essential to the success of the process.
While perhaps not suited for every case of exoneration, this
restorative-innocence approach holds promise in several important ways.
Currently, there is no mechanism for the falsely accused to express their
emotions concerning their experience to those responsible for putting
them in prison. Similarly, there is no mechanism for those who played a
role in the false conviction-irrespective of whether their errors were
intentional, negligent, or innocent-to offer apology or remorse to the
falsely convicted.
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Certainly, in some cases, prosecutors and police might not take
responsibility for their errors, but there is little harm in offering that
opportunity, particularly in a public venue. Even if they said nothing, the
experience of participating in a restorative-innocence proceeding has the
potential to mitigate similar errors in the future. In sum, this short Essay
offers a response to the problem of innocence by proposing a way to
respond to these travesties of justice that offers the possibility of both
healing and change.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

As noted in the Introduction, the innocence issue is one that covers
much ground and involves many diverse areas of criminal law and
procedure. The pieces herein serve as a reminder of the importance of the
innocence issue as a mechanism for assessing generally whether the
criminal justice system is functioning efficiently. Further, as illustrated
herein, the innocence issue can also serve to identify specific areas where
further research and analysis are warranted. Our institutions of criminal
law and adjudication are founded on principles of justice, but, where the
importance of innocence is lost, justice is an illusive concept. Hopefully,
these pieces will begin a broader conversation regarding the varying sides
and differing perspectives on the issue of innocence and lead to further
consideration of how society might use the issue of innocence to further
the mission of the criminal justice system.

